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Key Insights:
• Some consensus exists regarding the definition of strategic deception—the intentional manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information to mislead an adversary. However, significant
ethical, legal, and political questions persist concerning the conditions under which modern
democracies should apply it.
• Modern democracies assume that the use of deception will undermine trust, corrupt democratic
processes, and erode fundamental democratic values. However, the specific conditions under which this
assumption would prove correct (or incorrect) remain unexamined.
• Modern democracies, such as the United States, have ample tools available for employing
strategic deception effectively. However, no liberal-democratic theory or doctrine for its use
currently exists. Abstract guidelines, such as the Kantian Categorical Imperative, invariably fail when
applied to the practical world of international politics.
• Notwithstanding the importance of the rule of law to modern democracies, ethical and political
concerns actually hinder the use of strategic deception far more than do legal constraints.
• U.S. political and military leadership should invest more in achieving a better understanding of the
potential long- and short-term costs of employing strategic deception. Presumably, such a cost-benefit analysis already takes place in the development of national strategy. However, the effects of globalization might
aggravate those costs in ways that are not fully understood.
The use of strategic deception in war (or peace) is as old as governments and militaries. However, the
nature and extent of its employment is a major concern for modern democracies. Although, by definition,
strategic deception is an attempt to deceive an adversary, one can imagine any number of scenarios in
which its unintended or spill-over effects could mislead the public at home, as well as the populace of one’s
allies and friends. To what extent would such unintended consequences undermine a state’s credibility? For
societies such as the United States that are predicated on the principle of holding governments accountable,
strategic deception seems at best a necessary evil and at worst an unjustifiable and dangerous assault on

core values. The term strategic deception itself
brings with it a great deal of baggage that makes
objective discussion of it extremely difficult.
In an effort to strip away some of that baggage
and get at the root of the nature, extent, and potential
applications of strategic deception, the Triangle
Institute for Security Studies (TISS) and the U.S.
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
held a conference on October 31-November 1, 2003,
at the Friday Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
The purpose of the conference was to address the
ethical, legal, and policy challenges that arise when
democratic governments use deception. The Center
for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at the
U.S. Naval Academy and Duke University’s Kenan
Institute for Ethics participated as cosponsors.
Presenters and attendees included military
historians, philosophers and ethicists, members of
the military and intelligence communities, lawyers,
businessmen, and members of the press.

representatives from the military attempted to
clarify that strategic deception is directed at a foe,
not at the friendly populace. Therefore, if used
appropriately, it would not threaten the core values
of a democracy. Measures taken to limit unintended
consequences before, during, and after the act
should form an essential part of any use of strategic
deception.
In contrast, some members of the media
maintained that the use of strategic deception
would invariably involve the press as primary or
intermediate targets. Understandably, the media
expressed outrage at the possibility of being
exploited in this way. At times, their argument
wrongly equated the act of misleading the press
with an intent to deny freedom of the press, an
obvious violation of a right guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution. However, most members of the
press agreed that they should not have access to,
or publicize, details about military operations. One
presenter pointed out that the internet has changed
the equation regarding freedom of the press by
placing the capability to publish information
(whether misleading or otherwise) into the hands
of every citizen.
The conference also revealed that laws and
ethical standards offer little in the way of an
argument for or against the use of deception.
Experts on military and international law stressed
that legal constraints do little to limit the use of
deception, especially in war. International law
directly prohibits only perfidy (deceptive measures
which take advantage of symbols or positions of
trust―such as the use of a white flag or a Red Cross―
to attack, wound, or kill an enemy). Also, American
courts traditionally are reluctant to interfere in what
they see as “policy matters.” This reluctance stems
in part from the fact that the U.S. Constitution gives
a great deal of freedom of action to the President
in anything related to war. U.S. leaders, therefore,
find themselves with a fair amount of legal latitude
when it comes to the use of strategic deception.
Similarly, modern ethical systems do not
provide any consistent argument for or against the
use of deception. For example, one might argue―as
the 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant
did―that lying in any form and for any purpose
is a categorical evil. Yet, other theories, such as
that of enlightened self-interest and service for
the common good, do justify deceit in war. In fact,

MAJOR ISSUES
The conference addressed a wide range of
issues, but the discussion generally centered around
three overlapping questions. First, can a modern
democracy like the United States justify the use
of strategic deception―defined as the intentional
manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information to mislead an adversary? Although the
conference focused on wartime uses of deception,
the term wartime included war, preparation for
war, and what has come to be known in service
vernacular as military operations other than war.
Second, if the United States can justify the use of
strategic deception, what guidelines or principles,
if any, should it follow when employing it?
In other words, in what ways should modern
democracies limit their use of strategic deception so
as not to threaten their core values? Third, how can
the United States improve its current capabilities,
particularly against determined foes, and how can
it protect itself against being deceived? A brief
summary of the discussion follows.
CAN MODERN DEMOCRACIES JUSTIFY
THE USE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION?
As one might expect, answers to this
question varied considerably. On the one hand,
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the conference highlighted an important ethical
paradox: To save its democracy, the United States
might have to resort to deception which might in
turn harm the very values and institutions it is
fighting to preserve.
Political concerns―which tend to include
ethical and legal considerations―emerged as
the primary determinant in whether the use of
strategic deception is justifiable. The majority of
those present at the conference favored the “realist”
view that modern democracies can and should use
strategic deception if they employ proper damage
control and minimize the risks to their core values.

politics where states necessarily mislead each other
in order to protect their vital interests without
having to resort to war.
Feasibility. Clearly, the use of strategic deception
(or any political-military tool for that matter)
depends on having the necessary wherewithal
at hand. Evaluating the means at hand is a basic
step in formulating sound strategy. One presenter
posed the important question as to whether the
United States was actually keeping pace with the
world-wide development of new technological
means to invade information systems and create
misinformation. Are we, in fact, deceiving ourselves
regarding our alleged technological superiority?
The United States does have many natural assets
including high levels of technological experience
and citizens noted for their initiative and creativity.
Its culture is diverse and reflects a certain facility
with “spinning” information and “advertising”
goods. However, the conference pointed out that
the United States has not always made the best use
of its assets. It has not done well at capitalizing on
the diversity of its culture and its ethnic groups
to penetrate its adversaries at the highest levels,
for example. Nor does it invest in the resources
necessary to fully understand foreign cultures.
Understanding one’s opponents, what they want
and how they think, is absolutely crucial when
ascertaining the feasibility of a strategic deception
plan.
Costs-versus-Benefits. As previously noted,
strategic deception can have unintended consequences. In extremely mismanaged cases, it even
can erode international trust and harm those
political initiatives that depend on international
cooperation. It can also create mistrust between
the government, the military, the public, and the
media. Fortunately, democratic societies rely less on
trust than on accountability. Government officials
are extended a conditional trust that entitles the
populace to take action to remove those officials
should they violate that trust. Hence, democratic
societies may prove more resilient than generally
acknowledged by those who argue that deception
will necessarily undermine core democratic values.
This particular topic requires further research.
For obvious reasons, cost-benefit analyses
and other forms of risk management must take
place whenever states choose to employ strategic
deception. In addition, the rapid spread of

WHAT GUIDELINES SHOULD APPLY
TO THE USE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION?
If modern democracies are justified in using
strategic deception, what guidelines, if any, should
they follow? A tentative set guidelines did emerge
in the course of the conference, but they could apply
to any form of government, not just democracies.
The use of deception, like any political-military tool,
should follow the practical guidelines of necessity,
feasibility, and a costs-versus-benefits analysis.
Necessity. Most participants agreed that the
use of strategic deception is justified if 1) national
survival is at stake, and 2) deception is crucial to
victory. For example, Operation BODYGUARD in
1944, which deceived the Axis powers as to the true
D-Day invasion site, played a major role in securing
victory for the Allies in World War II. National
survival was clearly at stake, and the deception
itself was critical to achieving a successful landing.
Of course, one could use the same justification for
Hitler’s Plan Yellow, the invasion of France in 1940.
In Hitler’s eyes, national survival was at stake, and
the particular deception employed, which misled
the French and British as to the location of the
German main attack, was crucial to victory.
One presenter maintained that deception is a
tool of the weak and that, as the most powerful
nation on earth, the United States should eschew
deception in favor of using its might to achieve its
goals. However, this facile solution fails to take into
account the fact that the use of overwhelming force
will generate unintended consequences as well,
and that these might outweigh those caused by the
use of deception. In any case, a certain amount of
deception is inherent in the realm of international
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information and information technologies currently
associated with the effects of globalization might
complicate such analyses in ways that political
leaders may not yet fully understand. This topic
requires more attention as well.

ently ill-suited to engage in strategic deception.
The course of the discussion revealed that while
democracies do not keep secrets particularly well
and their political processes are generally slow and
cumbersome, history shows that they can indeed
carry out strategic deception successfully. Nor is
the United States culturally averse to deception; we
have used it effectively throughout our history. In
fact, some members of the international community
in general―and the Chinese in particular―are
convinced that the United States is not only good
at deception, but that its successful use of deception
explains our rise to power. This conference
thus helped clear away much of the confusion
surrounding the issue of strategic deception and
helped point the way for further study. SSI and
TISS will publish select papers from the conference
over the next several months.

HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES IMPROVE
ITS CAPABILITIES?
Despite the dangers, common sense dictates
that the United States should not ignore a tool that
can help it achieve its goals with greater efficiency.
While some may argue that the United States is
now in a position of strength and, as such, less
dependent on deception, strength is always relative
and never without its Achilles’ heels. Moreover,
some of the avowed enemies of the United States
remain committed to its destruction. They continue
to think and adapt to that end.
The United States, therefore, has a threefold
task. First, it must develop stronger theoretical
foundations for understanding deception, namely,
what it is that enables one to be deceived. For
example, it is easier to deceive an enemy into
believing something he or she wants to believe,
than it is to get them to embrace an entirely new
idea. A more developed theory of deception would
thus improve the probability that our strategic
deception plan will work.
Second, it must enhance professional military
education concerning strategic deception. While
tactical commanders understand the importance
of deception and routinely include deception plans
in their operational planning, senior leaders must
understand its potential effects at the strategic
level and the role that cyberspace could play
in it. U.S. political and military leaders should
reexamine current methods of risk assessment and
risk management to ensure they are adequate for
today’s global environment.
Third, the academic community should examine
more closely the potential impact of a government’s
use of strategic deception on core democratic
values. The key may well be that, regardless of
the political-military tool used, government must
remain accountable to the public. In what ways
can strategic deception be employed while still
preserving that accountability?
The conference began with the underlying
assumption that modern democracies were inher-
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